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ABSTRACT
Flow-based generative models leverage invertible generator functions to fit a distribution to the train-
ing data using maximum likelihood. Despite their use in several application domains, robustness of
these models to adversarial attacks has hardly been explored. In this paper, we study adversarial
robustness of flow-based generative models both theoretically (for some simple models) and em-
pirically (for more complex ones). First, we consider a linear flow-based generative model and
compute optimal sample-specific and universal adversarial perturbations that maximally decrease
the likelihood scores. Using this result, we study the robustness of the well-known adversarial
training procedure, where we characterize the fundamental trade-off between model robustness and
accuracy. Next, we empirically study the robustness of two prominent deep, non-linear, flow-based
generative models, namely GLOW and RealNVP. We design two types of adversarial attacks; one
that minimizes the likelihood scores of in-distribution samples, while the other that maximizes the
likelihood scores of out-of-distribution ones. We find that GLOW and RealNVP are extremely sen-
sitive to both types of attacks. Finally, using a hybrid adversarial training procedure, we significantly
boost the robustness of these generative models.
1 Introduction
The promise of modern deep generative models is to learn data distributions with sufficiently high fidelity, allowing
simulation of realistic samples. Some applications include photo-realistic image generation, audio synthesis, and
image to text generation (Reed et al., 2016; Ledig et al., 2017; van den Oord et al., 2016a). Generative Adversarial
Networks (GANs)(Goodfellow et al., 2014) have become a popular choice in modern generative modeling, often
obtaining the state-of-the-art results in image and video synthesis (Karras et al., 2018). While GANs can synthesize
samples from a data distribution, their inability to compute sample likelihoods limits their usage in statistical inference
tasks (Balaji et al., 2019).
Likelihood-based models, on the other hand, explicitly fit a generative model to the data using a maximum likelihood
optimization, enabling exact or approximate evaluations of sample likelihoods at the test time. Some popular choices
include auto-regressive models (van den Oord et al., 2016b), (Oord et al., 2016), Variational Auto-encoders (Kingma
& Welling, 2019), and methods based on normalizing flow (Rezende & Mohamed, 2015). Notably, flow-based mod-
els (Kingma & Dhariwal, 2018; Dinh et al., 2017) leverage invertible generator functions to learn a bijective mapping
between latent space and the data distribution, enabling an exact sample likelihood computation.
The focus of this paper is to perform a comprehensive study of robustness of likelihood-based generative models to
adversarial perturbations of their inputs. While there has been progress on adversarial robustness of classification
problems (Madry et al., 2018), robustness of likelihood models has not been explored in the literature. Performing
such a sensitivity analysis is crucial for reliable deployment, especially in safety-critical applications. For instance,
one application where likelihood estimation is crucial is unsupervised anomaly detection in medical imaging, where
out-of-distribution samples can be detected using likelihood scores. Adversarial attacks on such systems can lead to
false diagnosis, potentially bearing life-threatening consequences.
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Figure 1: Sensitivity of flow-based generative models to adversarial attacks. A low NLL indicates a high likelihood
score. The figure on the left panel shows in-distribution attacks: a frog image which is assigned a NLL score of 1.6
by GLOW model trained on CIFAR-10 (clean model) gives a high NLL of 150 when perturbed adversarially ( = 8 in
`∞ norm). Our robust model significantly improves the robustness: NLL does not change much after the attack, while
the score on the unperturbed sample is similar to the one obtained by the clean model. The panel on the right shows
out-of-distribution attacks where a noise image is assigned a low NLL of 4.2.
First, we present a theoretical analysis of the sensitivity of linear generative models that fit a Gaussian distribution to
the data (since the latent variable is often a Gaussian distribution itself). Under this setting, we compute the optimal
sample-specific and universal norm-bounded input perturbations to maximally decrease the likelihood scores. We
then analyze the effectiveness of one of the most successful defense mechanism against adversarial attacks, namely
adversarial training (Madry et al., 2018) where adversarially perturbed samples are recursively used in re-training the
model. We show that adversarial training can provably defend against norm-bounded adversarial attacks. However,
this comes at a cost of decrease in clean likelihood scores. This naturally gives rise to a fundamental trade-off between
model performance and robustness.
Next, we empirically show the existence of adversarial attacks on two popular deep flow-based generative models:
GLOW (Kingma & Dhariwal, 2018) and RealNVP (Dinh et al., 2017). A measure of likelihood, by definition, should
assign low scores to out-of-distribution samples and high scores to in-distribution ones. The existence of adversar-
ial attacks breaks and contradicts this intuition: We show that we can construct samples that look like normal (in-
distribution) data to a human eye, yet the model assigns to them low likelihood scores, or equivalently, high negative
log likelihood (NLL) scores. Similarly, we show the existence of out-of-distribution samples that are assigned low
NLL scores. One such example is shown in Figure 1, where a sample from CIFAR-10 dataset when adversarially
perturbed has high NLL score, and a random adversarially perturbed image (with uniform pixel intensities) has low
NLL score. This observation raises serious doubts about the reliability of likelihood scores obtained through standard
flow-based models.
To make these models robust, we investigate the effect of the popular adversarial training mechanism. We show that
adversarial training empirically improves robustness, however, this comes at a cost of decrease in likelihood scores
on unperturbed test samples compared to the baseline model. To mitigate this effect, we propose a novel variant
of adversarial training, called the hybrid adversarial training, where the negative log likelihoods of both natural
and perturbed samples are minimized during training. We show that hybrid adversarial training obtains increased
robustness on adversarial examples, while simultaneously maintaining high likelihood scores on clean test samples.
In summary, our contributions are as follows:
• We theoretically analyze the robustness of linear generative models, and show that adversarial training prov-
ably learns robust models. We also characterize the fundamental trade-off between model robustness and
performance.
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• We demonstrate the existence of in-distribution and out-of-distribution attacks on flow-based likelihood mod-
els.
• We propose a novel variant of adversarial training, called the hybrid adversarial training, that can learn robust
flow-based models while maintaining high likelihood scores on unperturbed samples.
2 Background
2.1 Flow-based Generative models
Although generative modeling is largely dominated by generative adversarial networks (GANs), one major short-
coming of GANs is its inability to compute sample likelihoods. Flow-based generative models solve this issue by
designing an invertible transformation f : RD → RD between latent distribution pz(z) and the generated distribution
px(x). pz(z) is often assumed to be a normal distribution. Given a random variable z ∼ pz(z), we can use change
of variables to write the log density of a sample x such that x = f(z) as (Dinh et al., 2015, 2017; Grathwohl et al.,
2019; Kingma & Dhariwal, 2018):
log px(x) = log pz(z)− log det
∣∣∣∣∂f(z)∂z
∣∣∣∣
Since f is invertible, inference can be performed as z = f−1(x). The transformation f is typically modeled as the
composition of K invertible maps, f = f1 ◦f2 ◦ · · · ◦fK , also called normalizing flows (Rezende & Mohamed, 2015).
The special structure used in each fi’s allows an efficient computation of the determinant.
Prominent examples of flow-based generative models include NICE (Dinh et al., 2015), RealNVP (Dinh et al., 2017),
GLOW (Kingma & Dhariwal, 2018), and FFJORD (Grathwohl et al., 2019), each using a particular choice of fk
. For instance, RealNVP (Dinh et al., 2017) is designed with affine coupling layers, essentially an invertible scale
transformation, while GLOW uses invertible 1 × 1 convolutions (Kingma & Dhariwal, 2018), which utilizes learned
permutations.
2.2 Adversarial Attacks and Robustness
In context of classification, adversarial examples are subtle input perturbations that changes a model prediction. These
perturbations are small in the sense of a suitable norm and imperceptible to humans. The existence of such examples
raises serious concern for the deployment of machine learning models in safety-critical applications
Let D = {(x, y)}Ni=1 be a collection of labeled input instances, θ be the parameters of a classifier with loss function
Lcls (e.g. cross-entropy). For a given x, let S be the set of all `p norm-bounded perturbations around x, i.e., ‖δ‖p < ,
where  is a constant, also called the perturbation radius. The perturbed sample is then given by xadv = x + δ.
Standard methods of crafting adversarial examples for classification include the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)
(Goodfellow et al., 2015)
xadv = x + α sign(∇xLcls(θ,x, y))
and its variant Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) (Kurakin et al., 2017)
x(t+1) = Projx+S
(
x(t) + α sign(∇x(t)Lcls(θ,x(t), y))
)
xadv = x(m)
which is essentially a recursive application of FGSM for m steps, while constraining the perturbation to stay within
the feasible region in each step. The above attacks have been shown effective on a variety of datasets (Carlini &
Wagner, 2017; Xie et al., 2019). For defense against such attacks, Madry et al. (2018) proposed adversarial training,
a procedure where the parameters θ of the model is optimized using the following minimax objective
min
θ
E(x,y)∼D
[
max
δ∈S
Lcls(θ,x + δ, y)
]
Intuitively, this amounts to training the model on adversarial examples instead of the unperturbed ones. Adversarial
training remains to be one of the successful defense mechanisms to date.
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2.3 Robustness of generative models
To the best of our knowledge, no prior work exists on adversarial robustness of likelihood-based generative models. In
Kos et al. (2018), attacks on encoder-based generative models (VAEs and VAE-GANs) are constructed to adversarially
manipulate reconstruction and latent-space tasks. Adversarial attacks on generative classifiers are explored in Fetaya
et al. (2019), where they show that even near optimal conditional generative models are susceptible to adversarial
attacks when used for classfication tasks. Nalisnick et al. (2019) discuss some non-intuitive properties of flow-based
generative models, studying GLOW in particular. They empirically observe that on a variety of common datasets,
GLOW models assign lower likelihoods to in-distribution data than out-of-distribution.
3 Adversarial robustness of linear flow-based generative models
We begin with an analysis of adversarial robustness of linear flow-based generative models. Since the latent variable Z
has a normal distribution and the transformation between Z andX is considered to be affine,X will have a distribution
in the form ofX ∼ N (µ,K) where µ is the mean vector andK is the covariance matrix. GivenN samples as the input
dataset D = {xi}Ni=1, we are interested in estimating the mean and covariance matrices of the generative distribution.
This problem can be solved using maximum-likelihood estimation, in which we find model parameters that maximize
the likelihood of the input dataset D. We know that log-likelihood of a test point x under the Gaussian distribution X
can be written as
L(x) = C − 1
2
log(|K|)− (x− µ)
TK−1(x− µ)
2
where C = n log(2pi)/2. It is a well-known result that maximizing the log-likelihood of the dataset D results in the
following estimators for mean and covariance:
µˆ =
∑
i xi
N
Kˆ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(xi − µˆ)(xi − µˆ)T
N
,
referred to as the sample mean and sample covariance, respectively.
3.1 Adversarial attacks
In this section, we aim to find a norm-bounded adversarial perturbation δ that maximally decreases the likelihood score
of a test point x. We consider adversarial perturbations with a bounded `2 norm (i.e., ‖δ‖2 < ). Please note that while
we use `2 norm here, `∞ perturbation norm bounds are used to construct attacks for non-linear flow-models trained
on vision datasets (Section. 5). We would like to point out that both `2 and `∞ are commonly used settings to study
adversarial robustness (Madry et al., 2018). The perturbation δ can be found by solving the following optimization
problem
min
δ
C − 1
2
log(|K|)− (x− µ+ δ)
TK−1(x− µ+ δ)
2
(1)
s.t. ‖δ‖2 < 
Theorem 3.1 Let L(x) denote the likelihood function of an input sample x under a Gaussian distribution N (µ,K).
Let K = UΛUT be the eigen-decomposition of the covariance matrix K. Let c = [c1, c2, . . . , cn] = UTK, and
Λ = diag([λ1, . . . λn]). Let η be a solution of the set of equations∑
i
c2i
(1− 2ηλi)2 = 
2
2ηλi − 1 ≥ 0 ∀i
Then, the optimal additive perturbation δ with norm bound ‖δ‖2 <  that maximally decreases the likelihood score of
sample x is given by
δ∗ = (K−1 − 2ηI)−1K−T (µ− x) (2)
The proof of Theorem 8.1 is given in supplementary material. The above theorem gives a solution for the optimal
adversarial perturbation with a bounded `2 norm for the linear flow-based generative models (solution to Eq. (1)). Ex-
ample optimal adversarial perturbations calculated for a 2-dimensional Gaussian distribution are visualized in Figure
2. Next, we show two special cases of this result.
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Figure 2: Examples of optimal adversarial perturbations with bounded `2 norm for a 2-dimensional Gaussian case.
3.1.1 Special case: Spherical covariance matrix
In this case, the covariance matrix is K = σ2I . In this setup, the solution for the adversarial perturbation problem (6)
simplifies to:
δ =
1
1− 2ηλ (µ− x)
Similarly, the condition for η simplifies to:
1− 2ηλ = ‖µ− x‖

Thus, the optimal adversarial perturbation δ in this case is given by
δ∗ =

‖x− µ‖ (x− µ) (3)
3.1.2 Special case: x = µ
In this case, the optimization 1 simplifies to:
min
δ
C − 1
2
log(|K|)− δ
TK−1δ
2
s.t. ‖δ‖2 < 
This is a Rayleigh quotient problem, the solution for which is the maximum eigenvalue of K−1. I.e.,
δ∗ =  umin(K)
where umin is the eigenvector of K corresponding to the minimum eigenvalue. Intuitively, minimum eigen-vector of
the covariance matrix K is the direction in which the data varies the least, a perturbation along this direction induces
a maximal drop in likelihood.
3.2 Defense against adversarial attacks
One of the most successful defense strategies against adversarial attacks is adversarial training (Section. 2.2), in which
models are recursively trained on adversarially perturbed samples instead of clean ones. In this section, we analyze
the effect of adversarial training for the likelihood estimation in the spherical Gaussian case. For an input sample x
under the generative distribution N (µ, σ2I), the adversarially perturbed sample using (3) is given by
xadv = x +

‖x− µ‖ (x− µ)
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We consider the population case where x ∼ N (µ, σ2I). Denote x˜ = (x − µ)/σ ∼ N (0, I). In this case, after one
update of adversarial training, optimal model parameters will be:
µadv = E[xadv]
= µ+ E
[ x˜
‖x˜‖
]
= µ
Kadv = E[(xadv − µ)(xadv − µ)T ]
= σ2E
[(
x˜ + 
x˜
‖x˜‖
)(
x˜ + 
x˜
‖x˜‖
)T ]
= σ2
(
E[x˜x˜T ] + 2E
[ x˜x˜T
‖x˜‖
]
+ 2E
[ x˜x˜T
‖x˜‖2
])
= σ2
(
I +
2
√
2
n
Γ((n+ 1)/2)
Γ(n/2)
I +
2
n
I
)
= σ2I + σ2αI = σ2(1 + α)I
where α = (
2
√
2
n
Γ((n+ 1)/2)
Γ(n/2)
+
2
n
)
The above result follows from the fact that sum of diagonal terms of x˜x˜T /‖x˜‖ has a Chi distribution with n degrees of
freedom. We observe that adversarial training preserves the mean vector, but increases the variance by a multiplicative
factor 1 + α.
Performing m steps of adversarial training results in the following estimate:
µadvk = µ (4)
Kadvk = σ
2(1 + α)mI
Using the above argument, we obtain the following robustness guarantees for adversarial training:
Theorem 3.2 Let x be an input sample drawn from N(µ, σ2I). Let L(x) denote the log-likelihood function of the
sample x estimated using an m-step adversarially trained model. Let δ be any perturbation vector such that ‖δ‖ ≤ .
For any ∆, when
m ≥ max
[
log
( 1
2σ2∆
(
2σ
√
20 log(1/γ) + 2
))
,
log
( 1
2σ2∆
[
2σ
√
2n+ 2
])]
/ log(1 + α)
with probability greater than 1− γ,
L(x)− L(x + δ) < ∆
The proof for this theorem is presented in the appendix. This theorem states that, with high probability and for a
sufficiently large m, m-step adversarial training learns a generative model whose likelihood estimates are provably
robust within ∆.
3.2.1 Trade-off between robustness and accuracy
The estimated parameters of our linear model after m steps of adversarial training is given in Eq. (4). The average
log-likelihood of unperturbed (clean) samples drawn from N (µ, σ2I) under the adversarially-trained model can be
computed as
Lnat(m) =− n
2
log(2piσ2(1 + α)m)
− Ex∈N (µ,σ2I) ‖x− µ‖
2
2σ2(1 + α)m
=− n
2
log(2piσ2(1 + α)m)− n
2(1 + α)m
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The drop in the natural likelihood due to adversarial training, which we define as Lnat−dr := Lnat(0) − Lnat(m),
simplifies as
Lnat−dr(m) =
n
2
[
log((1 + α)m) +
1
(1 + α)m
− 1
]
Lnat−dr(m) represents how much the average log likelihood scores will be different if we use anm-step adversarially-
trained model instead of the clean model. Larger m will lead to a larger drop in the accuracy of the likelihood compu-
tation. However, it will increase the robustness of likelihood scores against adversarial perturbations. To characterize
this trade-off, note that the likelihood of perturbed samples under the m-step adversarially trained model can be com-
puted as
Ladv(m) =− n
2
log(2piσ2(1 + α)m)
− Ex∈N (µ,σ2I)
‖x + ‖x−µ‖ (x− µ)− µ‖2
2σ2(1 + α)m
=− n
2
log(2piσ2(1 + α)m)
−
n+ 2
√
2Γ((n+1)/2)Γ(n/2) + 
2
2(1 + α)m
Hence, the adversarial sensitivity, which we define as Lsen(m) = Lclean(m)− Ladv(m) simplifies to
Lsen(m) =
2
√
2Γ((n+1)/2)Γ(n/2) + 
2
2(1 + α)m
(5)
Adversarial sensitivity indicates the drop in likelihood scores due to adversarial attacks. Higher the score, more
sensistive is the model to adversarial perturbations. We can see that Lnat−dr is at odds with Lsen. In Figure 3, we
plot the trade-off between natural likelihood drop vs. the adversarial sensitivity for different values of m in the range
[0, 10]. In this experiment, we use n = 10, and generate samples from a Gaussian distribution with a random mean
and covariance matrix. We observe that the setting that gives low performance drop incurs high robustness drop, and
vice-versa.
Figure 3: Plot showing the trade-off between performance and robustness for an example linear generative model.
3.3 Universal adversarial perturbation
In universal adversarial perturbation, we are interested in finding a single perturbation vector δ such that the population
likelihood (under the normal distribution) decreases maximally, i.e., we are interested in finding a perturbation δ such
that
min
δ
C − 1
2
log(|K|)
− Ex∼N (µ,K)
[
(x− µ+ δ)TK−1(x− µ+ δ)
2
]
s.t. δT δ = 2
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Simplifying the objective, we obtain
min
δ
Ex
[
− (x− µ)
TK−1(x− µ)
2
+ δTK−1(x− µ) + δ
TK−1δ
2
]
The first term is independent of δ, thus can be ignored. The second term is 0 since the mean of x is µ. Thus, the
optimization simplifies as
max
δ
δTK−1δ
2
s.t. δT δ = 2
This is the standard Rayleigh quotient problem, the solution for which is
δ∗ = λmax(K−1) = umin(K)
Remark: The adversarial distribution for the universal case is xadv = x+ umin(K). The perturbation in this case
only shifts the mean of the perturbed distrbution, but the covariance remains the same. Hence, adversarial training
results in the following estimation: µˆadv = µ + umin(K), and Kadv = K. Since only the mean gets shifted, the
resulting adversarially trained model can again be attacked with the same perturbation, resulting the same sensitivity
as the clean model. Hence, adversarial training is not successful to defend against universal adversarial attacks.
4 Adversarial attacks and defenses on non-linear flow-based models
In this section, we empirically study the robustness of deep flow-based generative models against adversarial attacks.
First, we adapt the PGD attack to the flow-based models by replacing the classification lossLcls with the log-likelihood
function. For normal (in-distribution) samples, we seek to compute perturbations with a bounded `∞ norm such that
the likelihood of the perturbed sample is decreased maximally. This defines our in-distribution attack. We also use the
crafted adversarial examples to recursively re-train the model to make it more robust against adversarial attacks, we
call this adversarial training.
Next, we explore a new type of adversarial attack on the flow-based generative models where the goal of the adversary
is to maximize the likelihood score of out-of-distribution (anomaly) samples to be similar to that of normal samples.
We call this attack the out-of-distribution adversarial attack. This amounts to ascending (rather than descending) on
the likelihood of out-of-distribution samples. We compare these attacks to random uniform noise, which is used as a
baseline.
We empirically observe that adversarially trained models obtain higher NLL (i.e. lower likelihood) on clean (un-
perturbed) data than models trained on clean data alone. This is expected as no clean samples were exposed at the
training time. However, this is undesirable as a good generative model should assign high likelihoods to in-distribution
samples. To mitigate this problem, we propose training simultaneously on both clean and adversarial examples. In
each batch of training, we mix clean and adversarial samples in 1:1 ratio. We call this procedure the hybrid adversarial
training. The analog of this method is known to fail for classification problems(Szegedy et al., 2014). However, it
succeeds to robustify flow-based generative models, while preserving likelihood on unperturbed samples.
5 Experiments
We perform experiments on two flow-based generative models: GLOW and RealNVP, on three datasets: CIFAR-
10, LSUN Bedroom, and CelebA. We evaluate the robustness of the three model varieties: models trained on clean
(unperturbed) data alone, models trained on adversarially-perturbed data alone (adversarial training), and models
trained on clean and adversarial data in 1:1 ratio (hybrid training). Adversarial and hybrid models were trained with
 = 8 and m = 10 attack iterations. More experimental details can be found in supplementary material. In all
experiments, we report negative log-likelihood values in the units of bits per dimension (Theis et al., 2016).
Figures 4 and 5 show visualizations of adversarial attacks on a GLOW model trained on unperturbed CIFAR-10 and
LSUN-bedrooms datasets respectively. In the top row, we show in-distribution attacks at different attack strengths.
We observe that in-distribution attacks are effective even at low  values. The effectiveness of these attacks are evident
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as the values are much higher compared to the uniform noise baseline (shown in middle row). In the last row, we
show out-of-distribution attacks, where a uniform noise image is perturbed to assign low NLL scores. For high attack
strength ( = 8), likelihood values are on-par with values obtained by in-distribution samples.
Figure 4: Sample visualizations of in-distribution, out-of-distribution and uniform noise attacks on a GLOW model
trained on CIFAR-10 dataset. Results on clean (unperturbed) data are reported as  = 0.
Figure 5: Sample visualizations of in-distribution, out-of-distribution and uniform noise attacks on a GLOW model
trained on LSUN-Bedroom dataset. Results on clean (unperturbed) data are reported as  = 0.
Next, we present quantitative results, where we report average sample likelihood scores (in bits/per dimension), aver-
aged over the test set. Likelihood scores on adversarial samples over a sweep of attack strength (attack ) for a GLOW
model trained on CIFAR-10 and LSUN Bedroom datasets are shown in Tables 1 and 2 respectively. We observe that
adversarially trained models improve robustness, however the NLL scores on unpertubed samples increase drastically.
Hybrid adversarial training, on the other hand, achieves (1) NLL on adversarial samples comparable to adversarially
trained model, and (2) likelihood on unperturbed samples comparable to clean baseline, i.e., hybrid model improves
robustness preserving the performance on unperturbed samples, thus achieving the best of both worlds.
9
 Clean Adv. Hybrid
0 3.4 4.7 3.6
1 6.3 4.9 4.7
2 14 5.0 5.0
4 320 5.3 5.3
8 2.0×106 5.8 5.9
Table 1: Robustness results of GLOW model trained on CIFAR-10
 Clean Adv. Hybrid
0 2.4 4.4 2.9
1 5.5 4.5 4.7
2 8.5 4.7 4.6
4 15.2 5.0 5.0
8 27.0 5.5 5.6
16 35.8 6.6 6.6
32 36.4 7.7 8.1
Table 2: Robustness results of GLOW model trained on LSUN-Bedrooms dataset
Attack Iterations CelebA LSUN
0 2.9 2.7
10 14.3 10.9
20 17.9 14.4
50 24.9 19.8
Uniform noise 5.8 4.8
Table 3: Adversarial attacks on RealNVP models trained on CelebA and LSUN Bedroom. All models were attacked
with  = 8.
In Table 3, we report robustness results for RealNVP trained on CelebA and LSUN Bedroom datasets over a sweep
of attack iterations. Due to computational constraints, we use a fixed  = 8. The results show that RealNVP is also
susceptible to adversarial attacks, similar to GLOW models.
In addition to these, we show some interesting results where samples generated from a model trained on perturbed
images have an adversarial effect on a model trained on unpertubed samples. This experiment can be found in supple-
mentary material.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we present a comprehensive analysis of adversarial robustness of flow-based generative models. First,
we a perform a sensitivity analysis of linear generative models, and show that adversarial training provably improves
robustness. Then, we demonstrate adversarial attacks on two non-linear flow-based generative models - GLOW and
RealNVP. To improve the robustness of these models, we investigate the use of adversarial training, a popular defense
mechanism used in classification. We show that adversarial training improves robustness at the cost of decrease
in likelihood on unperturbed data. To remedy this issue, we propose hybrid adversarial training, a novel defense
mechanism that improves adversarial robustness with a marginal drop in likelihood on unperturbed data.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
Theorem 8.1 Let L(x) denote the likelihood function of an input sample x under a Gaussian distribution N (µ,K).
Let K = UΛUT be the Eigen-decomposition of the covariance matrix K. Let c = [c1, c2, . . . , cn] = UTK, and
Λ = diag([λ1, . . . λn]). Let η be a solution of the set of equations∑
i
c2i
(1− 2ηλi)2 = 
2
2ηλi − 1 ≥ 0 ∀i
Then, the optimal additive perturbation δ with norm bound ‖δ‖2 <  that maximally decreases the likelihood score of
sample x is given by
δ∗ = (K−1 − 2ηI)−1K−T (µ− x) (6)
Proof: We are interested in generating an adversarial attack on linear models trained on Gaussian input distribution.
As explained in Section 2.1 of the main paper, adversarial perturbation δ on sample x can be obtained by solving the
following optimization:
min
δ
C − 1
2
log(|K|)− (x− µ+ δ)
TK−1(x− µ+ δ)
2
s.t. ‖δ‖2 < 
The Lagrangian L corresponding to this optimization can be written as
L =− (x− µ+ δ)
TK−1(x− µ+ δ)
2
+ η(δT δ − 2)
=− (x− µ)
TK−1(x− µ)
2
− (x− µ)TK−1δ
− δ
TK−1δ
2
+ η(δT δ − 2)
First-order necessary conditions (KKT) From the stationarity condition of KKT, the gradient of the Lagrangian
function w.r.t the optimization variables should be 0.
∇δL = −K−T (x− µ)−K−1δ + 2ηδ = 0
(K−1 − 2ηI)δ = K−T (µ− x)
δ = (K−1 − 2ηI)−1K−T (µ− x) (7)
From complementary slackness, we obtain
η(δT δ − 2) = 0 (8)
So, either η = 0 or δT δ = 2. When η = 0, δ = µ− x. For the other condition δT δ = 2, we obtain,
(µ− x)TK−1(K−1 − 2ηI)−2K−T (µ− x) = 2
Now, consider the Eigen-decomposition of matrix K = UΛUT , where Λ = diag(λ1, λ2, . . . λn). Using this in the
above equation, we obtain the condition ∑
i
c2i
(1− 2ηλi)2 = 
2 (9)
where c = [c1, c2, . . . cn] = UT (µ− x). Eq. (9) can be solved numerically to obtain the value of η.
Second order sufficiency condition: The Hessian of the Lagrangian function can be written as
∇2δδL = −K−1 + 2ηI
The above matrix should be positive semi-definite. This gives the following condition
2ηλi − 1 ≥ 0 ∀i (10)
We see that the solution δ = 0 does not satisfy this property, hence, it can be eliminated. Hence, the optimal perturba-
tion is the solution to Eq. (9) which satisfy Eq. (10).
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8.2 Proof of Theorem 3.2
Lemma 8.2 Let X be a χ2(n) distribution. Then, for any t > 1,
Pr(X ≥ 2tn) ≤ e− tn10
Proof: From Laurent & Massart (2000), we know that for a χ2(n) random variable X ,
Pr(X ≥ n+ 2√nx+ 2x) ≤ e−x
Substituting x = tn10 , we get
Pr(X ≥ n+ 2n
√
t/10 + 2tn/10) ≤ e−tn/10
Now, n(1 + 2
√
t/10 + 2t/10) < n(1 + 2t/10 + 2t/10) < 2nt for t > 1. Hence,
Pr(X ≥ 2nt) < Pr(X ≥ n+ 2n
√
t/10 + 2tn/10)
≤ e−tn/10
Theorem 8.3 Let x be an input sample drawn fromN(µ, σ2I). LetL(x) denote the log-likelihood function of the sam-
ple x estimated using a m- step adversarially trained model. Let δ be any perturbation vector having a norm-bound
‖δ‖2 ≤ . For any ∆, whenm ≥ max
[
log
(
1
2σ2∆
(
2σ
√
20 log(1/γ)+ 2
))
, log
(
1
2σ2∆
[
2σ
√
2n+ 2
])]
/ log(1+
α), with probability greater than 1− γ,
L(x)− L(x + δ) < ∆
Proof: From Section 3.1.1 of main paper, the optimal adversarial perturbation for spherical covariance matrix is
given by
δ =

‖x− µ‖ (x− µ)
From Section 3.2, we know that the estimated model parameters after m steps of adversarial training is given by
µadvm = µ
Kadvm = σ
2(1 + α)mI
Log-likelihood drop for this model under the optimal adversarial perturbation can then be computed as
L(x) = C ′ − ‖x− µ‖
2
2σ2(1 + α)m
L(x + δ) = C ′ − ‖x− µ‖
2
2σ2(1 + α)m
(
1 +

‖x− µ‖
)2
L(x)− L(x + δ) = 1
2σ2(1 + α)m
(
2‖x− µ‖+ 2
)
We want this likelihood difference to be less than ∆.
Pr(L(x)− L(x + δ) < ∆)
= Pr(
‖x− µ‖
σ
<
2σ2∆(1 + α)m − 2
2σ
)
We now reparameterize x˜ = x−µσ ∼ N (0, I). The norm vector ‖x˜‖2 then obeys a χ2(n) distribution with n degrees
of freedom. Then,
Pr(L(x)− L(x + δ) < ∆)
= Pr
(
‖x˜‖2 <
(2σ2∆(1 + α)m − 2
2σ
)2)
(11)
= 1− Pr
(
‖x˜‖2 ≥
(2σ2∆(1 + α)m − 2
2σ
)2)
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Now, we use Lemma 8.2 in (11). Set
t =
1
2n
(2σ2∆(1 + α)m − 2
2σ
)2
(12)
Then,
Pr
(
‖x˜‖2 ≥
(2σ2∆(1 + α)m − 2
2σ
)2)
≤ exp
(−1
20
(2σ2∆(1 + α)m − 2
2σ
)2)
≤ γ
Simplifying the above expression, we obtain,
m ≥
log
(
1
2σ2∆
(
2σ
√
20 log(1/γ) + 2
))
log(1 + α)
Also, in condition (12), we require t > 1. This gives,
m >
log
(
1
2σ2∆
[
2σ
√
2n+ 2
])
log(1 + α)
Hence, whenm ≥ max
[
log
(
1
2σ2∆
(
2σ
√
20 log(1/γ)+2
))
, log
(
1
2σ2∆
[
2σ
√
2n+2
])]
/ log(1+α), Pr(L(x)−
L(x + δ) < ∆) ≥ 1− γ . This concludes the proof.
Figure 6: Samples generated at different temperatures from an adversarially trained model, evaluated against a clean
model.
8.3 Are generated samples from adversarially trained model adversarial?
Generative models trained on adversarial examples provide a unique opportunity to ask the question of whether the
samples generated by this model has an adversarial nature. To do this, we generate samples from an adversarially
trained model, and evaluate their likelihood on model trained on unperturbed samples. We find that samples generated
by adversarially trained model are indeed adversarial with respect to the unperturbed model, at a strength comparable
to that on which the model was trained. These results are shown in in Figure 6.
8.4 Experimental Details
All model architectures for GLOW and RealNVP were trained with default values given in their respective implemen-
tations. Adversarial and Hybrid models were trained with  = 8, and m = 10 attack iterations. GLOW test sizes
for CIFAR-10 and LSUN Bedroom test size were N = 10, 000 and N = 1200 (default) respectively. For GLOW
robustness evaluations, adversaries were trained with m = 32 and m = 40 for CIFAR-10 and LSUN Bedroom
respectively.
For the random noise baseline, random images were generated as Unif[−, ] (centered) and then clipped to [0, 255].
Out-of-distribution attacks were performed with a Unif[0,255] random image, and trained trained with m = 100
iterations.
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8.5 Instability in GLOW likelihood evaluations on CIFAR-10 for high 
In our experiments, we observed variance in likelihood evaluations for GLOW models trained on CIFAR-10 under
strong adversaries (attack strengths  ≥ 8). On the other hand, low attack strengths ( < 8) had negligible variance.
This adds uncertainty as to the ”true” value of the attack strength, however we maintain that the trend is clear: stronger
adversaries are more disruptive of the likelihood score. As this paper is primarily concerned with the existence of
adversarial attacks and robust defenses, we consider this issue not germane to the present work. For completeness, we
give details on our investigation of this issue below.
Sources of randomness and numerical issues were investigated. Two sources of randomness found were (1) the addi-
tion of uniform random noise in the computation of continuous log-likelihoods (Equation (2) in Kingma & Dhariwal
(2018)) and (2) the random initialization of rotation matrices W in the invertible 1× 1 convolution (paragraph below
Equation (9) in Kingma & Dhariwal (2018)).
High NLL values correspond to very small probabilities. Since the entire computation is done in the log scale, un-
derflow is not a problem. Computations are by default performed with float32 , having the range of approximately
±3.4× 1038, which far exceeds the highest value we observed of 1016.
The authors of Kingma & Dhariwal (2018) propose LU-decomposition as a fast means of computing the determinant.
In the reference implementation this option was disabled by default. We found that enabling it helped with numeric
stability, with negligible drop in training speed.
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